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DYSFUNCTIONAL DEFERENCE AND BOARD 
COMPOSITION: LESSONS FROM ENRON 
Bernard S. Sharfman & Steven J. Toll* 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been over seven years since the public was first made aware that 
Enron (or the ―Company‖) was a troubled firm,1 ultimately doomed to 
bankruptcy and much litigation, both civil and criminal.  Yet, the Enron de-
bacle continues to fascinate researchers and the general population alike.  
Over the one-year period from September 3, 2007 to September 3, 2008, the 
Social Science Research Network has posted seventy-one papers that refe-
renced Enron in their abstracts.2  What appears most baffling to many ob-
servers, especially those interested in corporate governance, is the inability 
of Enron’s board of directors to get a handle on the massive fraud that oc-
curred under its watch.  For example, Charles M. Elson, director of the Cen-
ter for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware, stated in regard 
to the repeated warning signs that the Enron board received during this 
time, ―[t]hey should have inquired further,‖ and ―[t]hey were unwilling to 
ask and pursue tough questions.‖3  However, for all the research done, a sa-
tisfactory explanation has yet to be provided for why the Enron board—





  Mr. Sharfman is of counsel with and Mr. Toll is managing partner of Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & 
Toll, P.L.L.C. (Cohen Milstein) in Washington, D.C.  This Essay is dedicated to Gerri Elsen, Mr. 
Sharfman’s cousin, who provided a lifetime of love and support to Mr. Sharfman and his family.  The 
authors would like to thank Professor Michael Klausner of Stanford Law School and Cohen Milstein’s 
New York office corporate governance specialists, Cathy Torell, of counsel, and Alan Szydlowski, Di-
rector of Capital Markets, for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
1
  In March 2001 the wheels started to come off Enron’s wagon when an article in Fortune magazine 
raised questions about Enron’s financial statements.  See Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced?, 
FORTUNE, March 5, 2001, at 122; see also S. REP. NO. 107-70, at 12–13 (2002) (discussing the Fortune 
article and subsequent events in 2001 that began to evidence that ―not all was well at Enron‖). 
2
  See SSRN eLibrary Database Search, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/DisplayAbstractSearch.cfm (en-
ter ―Enron‖ in the ―Search Term(s)‖ section, then select ―Last Year‖ in the drop menu in the ―Options‖ 
row) (last visited Sept. 3, 2008) (link).  SSRN does not allow searches for exact dates, but does permit 
searches for abstracts posted within a specified period before the date of the search.  See id. 
3
  John A. Byrne, Commentary: No Excuses for Enron’s Board, BUS. WK., July 29, 2002, at 50. 
4
  A publicly held firm is an ―economic organization in which (i) management and residual claimant 
status (shareholding) are separable and separated functions; (ii) the residual claims (shares) are held by a 
number of persons; and (iii) the residual claims are freely transferable and neither entry to nor exit from 
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United States5—failed to detect the fraud that ultimately destroyed the com-
pany. 
Something was obviously amiss at the top of the Enron pyramid.  We 
assert that it had something very much to do with the composition of the 
Enron board, despite the largely impressive backgrounds of its individual 
members.  We, of course, are not alone in this opinion, as the fall of Enron 
has led to enhanced independence requirements for board members.6  
We certainly endorse the board member independence requirements of 
the stock exchanges and the enhanced independence guidelines as recom-
mended by proxy advisory companies that have developed as a response to 
the Enron scandal.7  Nevertheless, it is our position that corporate boards of 
publicly held firms would be better off and less prone to error if other rules 
or guidance were in place that required or strongly encouraged corporate 
board nominating committees to select members who were less prone to 
what we refer to below as ―dysfunctional deference.‖  To implement this 
critical change, we recommend: (i) limiting the number of former or current 
executive officers allowed to serve as outside directors; (ii) setting term 
limits for outside directors; (iii) diversifying the background of outside di-
rectors; and (iv) requiring outside directors to spend a minimum amount of 
time on board business. 
I. DYSFUNCTIONAL DEFERENCE 
It is easy to assume that two heads are better than one and that small 
groups will make better decisions than individual decisionmakers.  And 
perhaps, overall, that is correct.8  Even so, behavioral scientists have been 
                                                                                                                           
the firm is restricted.‖  Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 
463 n.9 (1992). 
5
  See Reed Abelson, ENRON’S COLLAPSE: THE DIRECTORS; Eyebrows Raised in Hindsight 
About Outside Ties of Some on the Board, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at C6, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE4DA153DF933A05752C1A9679C8B63, (noting 
that Chief Executive Magazine named Enron as one of the top five corporate boards in 2000) (link). 
6
  As so well put by Professors Blair and Stout, ―The notion that responsibility for governing a pub-
licly held corporation ultimately rests in the hands of its directors is a defining feature of American cor-
porate law; indeed, in a sense, an independent board is what makes a public corporation a public 
corporation.‖  Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 251 (1999).  However, having a majority of independent directors that meet objective 
criteria of independence achieves nothing unless these independent directors also exercise ―indepen-
dence of mind.‖  See John Roberts, Terry McNulty & Philip Stiles, Beyond Agency Conceptions of the 
Work of the Non-Executive Director: Creating Accountability in the Boardroom, 16 BRITISH J. MGT. S5, 
S19 (2005).  This, of course, is easier said than done. 
7
  At least ten of the so called ―independent‖ directors at Enron had conflicts involving consulting or 
legal work with the Company, or were associated with charitable organizations to which the Company 
had made significant charitable donations.  See Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of 
Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1264 (2003). 
8
  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) (―A wealth of experimental data suggests that groups often make better deci-
sions than individuals.‖). 
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saying for years that small deliberative groups are prone to error in their de-
cisionmaking if these groups are made up of a majority of members who are 
similar in position prior to deliberations.  Such groups can fall victim to 
what is referred to as ―group polarization‖—the tendency of a small deli-
berative group with an initial tendency to move in a given direction to move 
to even more extreme positions in that direction following group delibera-
tions.9  The corporate board is no exception to this problem.10 
However, the focus here is not group polarization, but something 
which we consider to be even more pernicious and error inducing for a cor-
porate board.  In regard to several important decisions, the board of Enron 
exhibited such extreme deference to Company management that there was 
little or no deliberation preceding some of the board’s most important deci-
sions.  We refer to this extreme deference to management that leads to little 
or no board deliberation prior to a board decision as ―dysfunctional defe-
rence.‖ 
A. Enron Revisited 
Even though the vast majority of a corporation’s decisions are made by 
corporate officers and their subordinates, the ultimate decisionmaking au-
thority rests with the board of directors.11  When a corporate decision has 
the appearance of impropriety or the potential for personal liability, corpo-
rate officers may sometimes choose to return the decision back to the board 
for approval or ratification.  Enron provided us with an excellent example 
of how a board should not handle such a situation. 
In 1999 and 2000, the Enron board approved waivers to the Compa-
ny’s code of conduct three times.  These waivers allowed Enron’s Chief Fi-
nancial Officer (CFO), Andrew Fastow, to establish and operate the now 
infamous LJM private equity funds.  These funds were set up to acquire 





  Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?  Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74 
(2000).  Professor Sunstein notes that the term ―group polarization‖ is misleading as it can be mistakenly 
interpreted to mean that group members move toward opposite positions.  Id. at 85. 
10
  See Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Mar-
kets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1020 (2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=604641 (link). 
11
  The ―heart‖ of corporate authority lies with the board of directors who have statutory authority to 
manage the corporation.  Delaware corporate law provides that: ―The business and affairs of every cor-
poration organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, 
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.‖  DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).  In reality, however, the vast majority of significant corporate decisions 
made in publicly held firms are shifted downward to senior officers.  The law provides for this by allow-
ing the board to relinquish its managerial responsibility and take on more of an oversight function by 
allowing the corporate board to provide ―direction‖ and not necessarily management and by allowing for 
the appointment of senior officers: ―Every corporation organized under this chapter shall have such of-
ficers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of direc-
tors which is not inconsistent with the bylaws . . . .‖  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2001). 
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ance sheet.12  Such an arrangement clearly provided Fastow with immense 
opportunities to engage in self-dealing transactions at the expense of Enron 
and its shareholders.13  Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened.14  Ken 
Lay, Enron’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at the time the funds were 
created, was cognizant of the controversial nature of this arrangement, and 
therefore sought board ratification despite the fact that he had full authority 
to approve the waiver on his own.15  That in itself should have led to long 
and intense board deliberations, yet very little in the way of deliberations 
were reported prior to board approval, evidencing an incredible and surpris-
ing deference to the recommendations of management.16 
B. The Pathology of Dysfunctional Deference 
Normally, deference by independent board members to the opinion of 
insiders and executive management is understandable and most likely bene-
ficial to corporate board decisionmaking.  Insider board members, such as 
the CEO, will enter board deliberations with a greater degree of knowledge 
and understanding regarding the true state of the company than the inde-
pendent directors.  This asymmetric distribution of information should be 
beneficial to board decisionmaking, assuming board insiders are honest 
about the pros and cons of a prospective decision with the other board 
members during deliberations. 
However, this deference to board insiders and executive management 
can also lead to serious errors in decisionmaking if the deference is so pro-
nounced that it stifles deliberation of a corporate board’s most controversial 
decisions.  In ratifying the waiver of the Company’s code of conduct for 
Fastow with little discussion, the Enron board members demonstrated defe-
rence to the recommendations of management, which should be viewed as 
dysfunctional and as an act of a board that had been captured by manage-
ment. 
1.  Informational Signals and Social Pressures—Dysfunctional defe-
rence to executive management and their representatives on the board ap-





  See S. REP., supra note 1, at 7–8.  The purpose of establishing these entities was to help maintain 
the Company’s investment grade credit rating based on the criteria established by rating agencies such 
as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.  Id. at 7.  Interestingly, only two of the funds ever became active, 
LJM1 and LJM2.  Id. at 24 n.56. 
13
  See id. at 24. 
14
  See Exhibit A to Plea Agreement, United States v. Fastow, Cr. No. H-02-0665, (S.D.Tex. Jan. 14, 
2004) (statement of Andrew Fastow to ―provid[e] a factual background for [his] plea of guilty‖ to 
charges of manipulating financial statements and engaging in self-dealing transactions). 
15
  S. REP., supra note 1, at 25. 
16
  While there was no evidence of significant deliberations on the topic of the LJM private equity 
funds at the three board meetings where they were approved, supposedly there was a vigorous discus-
sion of LJM2 at a board finance committee meeting prior to the approval of LJM2.  However, it is not 
known whether Fastow’s conflict of interest, the economics of the transaction itself, or both, was the 
subject of discussion.  See id. at 28. 
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board members ―to fail to disclose what they know out of respect for the in-
formation publicly announced by others‖ or through social pressures, 
―which lead people to silence themselves in order to avoid reputational 
sanctions, such as the disapproval of relevant others.‖17 
According to Sunstein and Hastie, ―the strength of the informational 
signal will depend on the number and nature of the people who are giving 
it.‖18  Applying this to a corporate board, if a board’s members include one 
or more individuals who are acknowledged to be experts on company oper-
ations or have an excellent track record of success, such as inside directors, 
then the other board members are likely to be very reluctant to challenge 
their opinions and recommendations.  Moreover, people are very uncom-
fortable being sole dissenters.19  In this situation, ―if all but one person in a 
deliberating group has said that X is true, then the remaining member is 
likely to agree X is true, even to the point of ignoring the evidence of his 
own senses.‖20  This phenomenon is somewhat mind-boggling, but the re-
sult is that the board may be deprived of key information that potentially 
could prevent it from making a bad decision. 
The strength of the social pressure will depend on the ―number and na-
ture of those with the majority position.‖21  The greater the majority, the 
greater the social pressure on individual members. Moreover, ―if certain 
group members are leaders or authorities willing and able to impose social 
sanctions of various sorts, others will be unlikely to defy them publicly.‖22  
Given the minimal amount of personal contact between Enron board 
members it does not appear that significant social pressures were at work.  
The contact of non-insider board members with Enron and its management 
was quite limited: the Enron board normally held only five regular meetings 
per year,23 and outside of formal board meetings, board members did not 
have much interaction with each other or with Enron management.24 
However, a look into Enron’s history reveals how the board could have 
been captured by insiders and executive management on the basis of infor-
mational signals.  By August 2000, Enron was the seventh largest U.S. firm 
by capitalization.  Enron had also been named the most innovative firm in 





  Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, Four Failures of Deliberating Groups 2 (John M. Olin Law & 
Economics Working Paper No. 401 (2d Series) and Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 
215, Apr. 2008), available at https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/401.pdf (link). 
18
  Id. at 5. 
19
  See id. 
20
  Id. 
21
  Id. at 6. 
22
  Id. 
23
  S. REP., supra note 1, at 9. 
24
  See id. at 10. 
25
  William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. R. 1275, 1276 
(2002). 
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the perception in the minds of board members and the general public alike 
was that somebody was doing something right at Enron.  Moreover, given 
the limited interaction between board members and management, and with 
so little expected of board members,26 it was reasonable for outside board 
members to rely heavily on the opinions of inside board members and ex-
ecutive management. 
In addition, the profile of the average Enron independent board mem-
ber included a stint as a chief executive officer.27  Such a background is 
conducive to identifying with executive management and perhaps viewing 
his or her role at Enron as making sure not to get in the way of what execu-
tive management wanted to do.  In the context of executive remuneration, 
Professors Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck have already utilized this rationale 
in recommending that the number of active CEOs on a public company’s 
board be limited.28  Indeed, initial statistical evidence has borne this out.  
While Kaufman, Englander, and Tucci have only found weak statistical 
evidence that the more CEOs on the board of directors the higher the CEO 
compensation, they did find a strong statistical association between the 
number of CEOs on a public company’s board compensation committee 
and the level of CEO pay.29 
Finally, the profile of the average board member included many years 
of service on the Enron board, which—particularly during a long period of 
time when things are going right at the Company—may induce an outside 
director to believe that executive management can do no wrong, leading her 
to become highly deferential to executive management recommendations.  
For example, if the Enron board had developed over time the perception 
that Lay, Jeffrey Skilling (former President and Chief Operating Officer), 
and Fastow were geniuses—or close to it—because they had up to that 
point an unblemished string of successes, a board just might go along with 
the controversial idea of allowing the Company’s CFO to enter into such a 
risky conflict of interest transactions. 
2.  Informational Cascades—As in chess, the advantage in small 
group decisionmaking goes to the player who has the benefit of making the 





  Board responsibilities were limited to, basically, five two-day meetings per year plus prep time.  
S. REP. supra note 1, at 9–10. 
27
  See Enron, Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Schedule 14A), at 3–9 (Mar. 21, 2000), available at 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/0000950129-00-001279.txt (listing the eighteen nominees 
to be elected by shareholders to the eighteen positions on the board of directors) (link). 
28
  See Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy & Eric G. Wruck, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, 
How We Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 55 (Harvard NOM Working Paper 
No. 04-28; ECGI-Finance Working Paper No. 44/2004, July 12, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305 (link). 
29
  Allen Kaufman, Ernie Englander & Christopher L. Tucci, The Managerial Thesis Revised: Inde-
pendent Directors and the CEO ―Directorate‖ 34 (July 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Northwestern University Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030845 (link). 
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mean that board insiders and executive management whom they represented 
did not get to have their say.  Board members were provided management-
generated briefing papers prior to the board meeting,30 no doubt recom-
mending or at least leaning in the direction of approving Fastow’s participa-
tion in the private equity funds.  In an assumed state of strong deference to 
insider and executive management recommendations, this may have caused 
an informational cascade, which was very hard for the outside board mem-
bers to overcome.31  According to Sunstein and Hastie, ―a cascade is a 
process by which people influence one another, so much so that participants 
ignore their private knowledge and rely instead on the publicly stated judg-
ment of others.‖32  Interestingly, people are not considered to be acting irra-
tionally when they come under the influence of an informational cascade; 
they are simply succumbing to the pressure of the signals provided by oth-
ers in the group.33  This may have been the effect of the management gener-
ated briefing papers.  Alternatively, a domino effect may have been created 
where the acceptance of the management position by some board members 
(Ken Lay for one) provided a signal to other board members to also accept 
the position—right or wrong—without receiving any new information, or to 
ignore or fail to disclose any private information or reservations that may 
have helped the board move in the direction of disallowing the waivers.  In 
either case, the insiders on the board got to be the leaders in a game of fol-
low the leader with minimal verbal communication. 
C. Groupthink 
Marlene A. O’Connor has argued that these failures of the Enron board 
were due to another problem with small group deliberations called ―group-
think,‖ which can be described as ―a mode of thinking that people engage in 
when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ 
striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically appraise al-
ternative courses of action.‖34 Thus, too much of a warm and fuzzy feeling 
between board members can lead a board to make wrong decisions.  Yet, 
the Enron board did not give the appearance of being overly cohesive.  As 





  S. REP., supra note 1, at 27 (written materials on LJM1 were faxed to board members three days 
prior to meeting).  It was typical for management to provide extensive background and briefing mate-
rials prior to a board meeting.  Id. at 9. 
31
  Sunstein & Hastie, supra note 17, at 12–13. 
32
  Id. at 12.  O’Connor defines a cascade to be ―a process whereby an entire group quickly comes to 
share a view, which may be false, because some people in the group appear to accept the belief.‖  
O’Connor, supra note 7, at 1240.  Or, in the context of game theory, ―an information cascade . . . is a 
situation in which every subsequent actor, based on the observations of others, makes the same choice 
independent of his/her private signal.‖  Wikipedia, Informational Cascades, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_cascade (last visited Sept. 12, 2008) (link). 
33
  See Sunstein & Hastie, supra note 17, at 12–14; Wikipedia, supra note 32. 
34
  O’Connor, supra note 7, at 1238 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/38/ 160 
very little interaction at other times.35  Furthermore, groupthink focuses on 
small group decisionmaking occurring at times of high stress.36  However, 
the key decisions facilitating the fraud at Enron occurred during the time 
when Enron was doing extremely well, which no doubt minimized the 
stress of board decisionmaking.  Counterbalancing this lack of personal in-
teraction outside the board room was the similarity in career backgrounds, 
as most of the board members had experience as CEOs of large institutions 
and very long average tenures on the board.37  Still, it is hard to imagine that 
this was enough to create an environment where groupthink prevailed.  
Dysfunctional deference—not groupthink—was the more likely cause of 
these serious errors in board decisionmaking. 
II. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Professor William Bratton expressed a very pessimistic outlook for 
corporate governance based on the Enron story: ―Enron, then, reminds us 
that the monitoring model assures us of little.  It gives only a circumstantial 
guarantee of good governance because it only requires evidence of a ―con-
scientious,‖ well-informed business judgment.  The conscientiousness itself 
is ill-suited to ex post verification.‖38  If that is so, then up-front improve-
ments in board composition become that much more important in reducing 
error in corporate board decisionmaking. 
Without requiring all board members to be independent, it is impossi-
ble to avoid the informational advantages insiders have in board delibera-
tions and the natural deference to insiders and executive management that 
this situation creates.  However, an all independent board would then be 
without the insights, knowledge and understanding of those who know the 
company the best.  This would cause more harm than good in board deci-
sionmaking.  Alternatively, and ideally, public corporations can work to 
minimize the negative aspects of a mixed board by tailoring board composi-
tion in a way that minimizes dysfunctional deference to insiders and execu-
tive management. To this end, based on the lessons of Enron, we 
recommend the following: 
1. Limit the Number of Former or Current Executive Officers—Limit 
the number of outside directors who have been or are CEOs of large institu-
tions—public or private—to less than a majority of outside directors in or-
der to reduce the potential for over identification with insiders and 
executive management. 
2. Set Term Limits—Term limits are critical to ensure that outsider 






  See S. REP., supra note 1, at 9. 
36
  See O’Connor, supra note 7, at 1267. 
37
  See id. at 1263. 
38
  See Bratton, supra note 25, at 1337–38. 
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3. Require Knowledge of the Company—Board nominating commit-
tees should select outside directors who have knowledge of the Company’s 
business or who could potentially learn quickly and with a sufficient depth 
of understanding.  As stated by McNulty and Roberts in their study on the 
effectiveness of boards, ―the exercise of power and influence that comes 
with the position of non-executive is critically conditioned by their know-
ledge of the company.‖39 
4. Establish Modified Diversification—Nominate outside directors 
with diverse backgrounds, but not to the extent that there is potential for 
prospective board members to become lone dissenters.  This would also ap-
ply to shareholder nominated directors.  Better to have multiple sharehold-
er-nominated directors than just one. 
5. Require Minimum Time Commitments—It was striking how little 
time board members—as the most important decisionmakers at Enron—
were required to devote to their duties.  Although board membership is con-
sidered a part-time position, there is a need for a minimum time commit-
ment to ensure that outside board members gain the confidence to deliberate 
and vote on an issue without total reliance on management recommenda-
tions. 
While each recommendation is geared toward minimizing the risk of 
dysfunctional deference, these recommendations are purposely general.40  
Each publicly held firm is different, requiring a unique, tailored application 
of these recommendations to fit the needs of each company.  Implementa-
tion of these recommendations can come through a number of different me-
chanisms: securities class action or derivative suit settlements, charter or 
by-law amendments, institutional shareholder engagement, new stock ex-
change rules, or positions taken by proxy advisory companies.  Moreover, 
empirical analysis has yet to be done that could help to both fine tune these 
recommendations and propose new ones.  For example, statistical analysis 
that looks at board composition as a function of securities fraud, with the 
independent variables differentiating between criminal and civil events.  All 





  Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, supra note 6, at S19.  This recommendation also requires that the 
company provide a minimum amount of director education in order for the outside director to get up to 
speed on the operations of the firm.  For example, management led orientation programs focusing on 
company operations. 
40
  Of course, there are many other possible improvements in corporate governance—such as majori-
ty voting and annual election of directors—that might reduce the likelihood of a similar debacle in the 
future.  See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Sabramanian, The Trouble with 
Staggered Boards: A Reply to Georgeson’s John Wilcox, 11 CORP. GOV. ADV. 17 (2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=384980 (link); Stephen Deane, Majority Voting in Director Elections: From the 
Symbolic to the Democratic (Institutional Shareholder Services Institute for Corporate Governance, 
White Paper, 2005), available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/MVwhitepaper.pdf (link).  We have li-
mited our recommendations in this Essay to those that we believe would help to minimize dysfunctional 
deference. 
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corporate boards must defend against, with board composition being a via-
ble tool in its prevention. 
